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Scholarship as Dialogue?  
ICL, TWAIL and the Politics of Methodology* 
 
 
Abstract: Scholars of International Criminal Law (ICL) and Third World Approaches 
to International Law (TWAIL) rarely speak to each other and part of the reason for 
this is often divergent approaches to methodology. Thus this article begins with an 
exploration of the ways in which international lawyers (mis)conceive methodology in 
their work so as to account for patterns of scholarly dialogue as well as silence. I 
argue in this article that ICL scholars can learn from TWAIL experiences with 
methodology, especially as the ICL field leaves the ‘honeymoon’ phase and enters a 
more ‘mature’ period that calls for greater reflexivity by practitioners and scholars 
alike. Understanding methodology with and against TWAIL is one way of contributing 





Scholars of International Criminal Law (ICL) and Third World Approaches to 
International Law (TWAIL)1 rarely speak to each other in spite of both having gained 
momentum in the heyday of post-Cold War multilateralism, judicial institut ion-
building and a renewed faith in the possibility of social transformation through law. 
There are many reasons for this lack of engagement, ranging from the scholarly 
histories of ICL and TWAIL, their animating purpose and attendant professiona l 
identities, along with their respective status within the international law academy and 
field of practice. ICL and TWAIL also differ as although both are scholarly 
movements, only ICL can be understood more broadly as a proper set of norms, a 
                                                 
* Thanks to Jerusa Ali, Sarath Burgis-Kasthala, Hilary Charlesworth, Rachel Hughes, Lia Kent, Asad 
Kiyani, Heidi Matthews, John Reynolds, Sujith Xavier and the reviewer/s for their comments and to 
Sascha Kouvelis for research assistance. This research was funded by the Australian Research Council.  
1 Some exceptions from TWAIL scholars writing in ICL include C. C. Jalloh, ‘Regionalizing  
International Criminal Law?’, 9 International Criminal Law Review (2009) 445; V. Nesiah, ‘From 
Berlin to Bonn to Baghdad: A Space for Infinite Justice’, 17 Harvard Human Rights Journal (2004) 
75; O. C. Okafor and U. Ngwaba, ‘The International Criminal Court as a “Transitional Justice” 
Mechanism in Africa: Some Critical Reflections’, 9 International Journal of Transitional Justice 
(2015) 90; J. Reynolds and M. Kearney, ‘Palestine and the Politics of International Criminal Justice’, 
in W. Schabas et al. (eds), The Ashgate Research Companion to International Criminal Law: Critical 
Perspectives (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013) 407-433; and S. Xavier, ‘Looking for “Justice” in all the Wrong 
Places: Creating an International or Hybrid Criminal Tribunal for Sri Lanka?’, A. Amarasingam and D. 
Bass (eds), Post-War Sri Lanka: Problems and Prospects (Hurst/Oxford University Press 2015, 




branch of public international law generating an institutionalised movement within 
international politics. For ICL, its rise is an indisputable fact: new specialised journals, 
general publications, conferences as well as its discursive uptake in a number of 
scholarly, practice-oriented and policy spheres. It would seem then that riding this 
wave of ICL-success requires no changes in course or technique whether through 
dialogue with a TWAIL sensibility or any other form of critique.2 Yet once we probe 
underlying ICL currents, the journey no longer seems so effortless, indicating instead 
that a masterful form of freestyle is required to navigate ICL’s contradictory pulls of 
law and politics and of humility and domination.  
In this article, I explore general questions of methodology in international law 
before focussing specifically on ICL methodology. I seek to enrich ICL scholarship 
by placing ICL in dialogue with TWAIL approaches to methodology. Typically, 
mainstream ICL scholarship overlooks questions of methodology.3 These scholarly 
silences are partially compensated by an expanding body of work on the 
interdisciplinary fringes of ICL including anthropology, criminology and sociology 
discussed below. These disciplines also inform TWAIL methodological debates, 
which are far more common than their ICL counterparts. Yet although TWAIL 
scholarship is more comfortable raising questions about methodology, it is not 
possible to identify a shared methodology. At best, we can speak of a TWAIL 
sensibility. I argue in this article that ICL scholars can draw from TWAIL experiences, 
especially as the ICL field leaves the ‘honeymoon’ phase and enters a more ‘mature’ 
period that calls for greater reflexivity by practitioners and scholars alike. 4 
Understanding methodology with and against TWAIL is one way of contributing to 
ICL’s scholarly evolution.  
                                                 
2 William Schabas also deploys a ‘riding the wave’ metaphor in W. A. Schabas, ‘The Banality of 
International Justice’, 11 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2013) 545-551. But see Vasiliev  
who argues that in the area of practice, ICL is already a ‘shrinking field’ with large numbers of experts  
on the job market facing a ‘career dead end’. This is not the case on academia, where ‘ICL shows no 
signs of recession.’ S. Vasiliev, ‘On Trajectories and Destinations of Interna tional Criminal Law 
Scholarship’ 28 Leiden Journal of International Law (2015) 701, at 705, 706.  
3 For example, see the symposiums on ICL and socio-legal methodologies in the Leiden Journal of 
International Law (2013) 26 (4), at 933-1023; and (2014) 27 (1), at 189-260. 
4 D. Luban, ‘After the Honeymoon: Reflections on the Current State of International Criminal Justice’ , 
11 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2013) 505; and M. Drumbl, ‘Collective Violence and 
Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass Atrocity’, 99 Northwestern University Law Review 
(2005) 551, at 607-608. 
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This article begins by broadly exploring the nature of methodology in 
international legal scholarship. It then moves on to map out the nature and purpose of 
ICL scholarship and links this with both its stated and unstated dominant 
methodologies. I then consider how TWAIL scholars understand methodology. 
Equipped with these accounts about the relationship between actors (scholars) and 
processes (methodology), we can then assess their outcomes through one of their 
shared aims of ending violence through law. Debates will persist as to whether the law 
can subvert various forms of violence,5 but at the very least, an honest dialogue about 
the methodological strengths and weaknesses of ICL and TWAIL is a start.  
 
2. Linking Methodologies to Scholarly Purpose: Reflexivity in the Field of 
International Law 
International law is a scholarly field or vocation that contains within it a set of often 
unspoken background rules that inform the way international lawyers see themselves 
as well as their site of academic production. According to Pierre Bourdieu, people 
learn how to operate in social fields not as a matter of choice, but by being born into 
them and then undergoing a slow process of acculturation that occurs before any 
conscious decision to enter or exit the field.6 In contrast to social fields, internatio na l 
lawyers choose to enter the juridical field. Yet, once they commit to the profession, 7 
international lawyers are shaped by and shape the specific logics of international legal 
forms.8 Thus, successful international lawyers do not simply follow positive norms of 
scholarly conduct. Through the gradual acculturation to the international legal habitus, 
they become competent in speaking international legal discourse fluently – meaning 
that they do not need to consult handbooks of grammar and lexicography to craft 
                                                 
5 We can understand the law as constitutive of violence: R. Cover, ‘Violence and the Word’ 95 Yale 
Law Journal (1986) 1601-1629. 
6 P. Bourdieu, The Logic of Practice (Stanford University Press, 1990 [1980], trans. R Nice), at 67.  
7 On commitment, see M. Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law (Hart Publishing, 2011), at 
ch 11.  
8 P. Bourdieu, ‘The Force of Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field’, 38 Hastings Law Journal 
(1987) 814. For a consideration of Bourdieu’s theory and international law, see U. Özsu, ‘The Question 
of Form: Methodological Notes on Dialectics and International Law’, 23 Leiden Journal of 
International Law (2010) 687, at 698 ff. For a field-based analysis of International Criminal Justice, 
see P. Dixon and C. Tenove, ‘International Criminal Justice as a Transnational Field: Rules, Authority 
and Victims’ 7 International Journal of Transitional Justice (2013) 393-412. 
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successful arguments.9 For Martti Koskeniemmi, the ‘final arbiter of what works is 
nothing other than the context [or field] (academic or professional) in which one 
argues.’10 This process of becoming an international lawyer then is about the formatio n 
of professional identities which contain within them a normative commitment to the 
field and its purpose as well as a strong sense of what types of professional behaviour 
and speech underpins the field.11  
History also informs the development of scholarly fields as a widely accepted 
narrative about a field’s origins will provide not only a sense of shared experiences, 
but a way of thinking about directions for the future.12 We can understand ICL as a 
specialised regime13 within the expanding wider ‘terrain’ of international law which 
is ‘made up of towns and villages with interconnecting paths and highways.’ 14 
Although ICL practice and scholarship does possess particular logics, these are not so 
pronounced as to constitute a radical break with (or fragmentation of) that internationa l 
law tradition.15  
Academic fields will invariably foster and support certain paradigms and 
international law is profoundly shaped by liberalism as a paradigm and a theory. 
Paradigms comprise a shared way of positing knowledge: epistemology, ontology and 
axiology. From a paradigm then flows particular theoretical lenses such as social 
science or feminist theories. This theoretical basis will shape ways of understand ing 
the process of inquiry itself or methodology, thus framing the ways in which research 
is conducted and the questions that are asked. From this point, there are a variety of 
ways or methods to answer a given question such as interviews, discourse analysis and 
                                                 
9 M. Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument 
(Cambridge University Press, 2005), at 566-573. 
10 Emphasis added, M. Koskenniemi, ‘Letter to the Editors of the Symposium’, 93 American Journal 
of International Law (1999) 351, at 356. 
11 G. Simpson, ‘Linear Law: The History of International Criminal Law’, in C. Schwöbel (ed.), Critical 
Approaches to International Criminal Law: An Introduction  (Routledge, 2014) 159-179, at 173.  
12 Generally see M. Koskenniemi, The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International 
Law 1870-1960 (Cambridge University Press, 2002).  
13 M. Koskenniemi, ‘The Fate of Public International Law: Between Technique and Politics’ , 70 
Modern Law Review (2007) 1-30.  
14 Oscar Schachter quoted in D. J. Bederman, The Spirit of International Law (University of Georgia 
Press, 2002), at 106.  
15 See V. Nerlich, ‘Daring Diversity – Why there is Nothing Wrong with “Fragmentation” in 
International Criminal Procedures’, 26 Leiden Journal of International Law (2013) 777-781. Scholars 
disagree over the question of international law’s unity or fragmentation. For an overview, see M. Prost, 
The Concept of Unity in Public International Law  (Hart Publishing, 2012), at 8-14. 
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the compiling of statistical data.16 Typically, specific paradigms and theoretical lenses 
will frame the methodology and choice of methods used to research a particular issue. 
Within a given academic field, a dominant paradigm – such as liberalism – will inform 
(often unconscious) choices about methodology with inevitable politica l 
ramifications. 
Research across fields – interdisciplinarity – produces particular tensions. Yves 
Dezalay and Mikael Madsen suggest examining actors who can operate in mult ip le 
fields as a way of understanding the fluid boundaries of a given field’s logic.17 For 
example, a sociology of the ICL field would be alive to the ways in which judges, 
scholars and activists circulate within and beyond international criminal tribuna ls 
(ICTs) as well as the extent to which non-ICL-expert international lawyers and 
laypeople can influence the discourse and practice of ICL.18 How is expertise produced 
and sustained within ICL scholarship and practice? What are the barriers to entry and 
what are the stakes in disrupting prevailing ICL conduct as scholar, practitioner or 
activist? Given the connection between disciplines and their attendant worldviews, 
specific academic sites will tend to nurture certain types of inquiry. For example, in 
their work on the contribution that victim surveys conducted through public health 
research can bring to mounting ICL prosecutions, Jamie Rowen and John Hagan 
concede that such research ‘may ask different questions’ from those asked by 
international criminal lawyers.19 Thus, perhaps the most valuable result of reflecting 
                                                 
16 J. W. Creswell and V. L. Plano Clark, Designing and Conducting Mixed Methods Research  (2nd ed., 
Sage, 2011), at 39 and generally ch 2.  
17 Y. Dezalay and M. R. Madsen, ‘The Force of Law and Lawyers: Pierre Bourdieu and the Reflexive 
Sociology of Law’, 8 Annual Review of Law and Social Science (2012) 433, at 441.  
18 For sociological accounts of the place of lawyers within the ‘conflict field’, see S. Dezalay, 
‘Lawyering war or talking peace? On militant usages of the law in the resolution of internal armed  
conflicts: A case study of international alert’, in Y. Dezalay and B. G. Garth (eds), Lawyers and the 
Construction of Transnational Justice (Routledge, 2012) 60-83; and R. Levi and J. Hagan, ‘Lawyers , 
humanitarian emergencies and the politics of large numbers’, in Y. Dezalay and B. G. Garth (eds), 
Lawyers and the Construction of Transnational Justice  (Routledge, 2012) 13-47. 
19 J. Rowen and J. Hagan, ‘Using Social Science to Frame International Crimes’, 10 Journal of 
International Law and International Relations (2014) 92, at 100. Also for a sociology of human rights, 
war crimes and humanitarian emergencies, see J. Hagan et al., ‘The Science of Human Rights War 
Crimes and Humanitarian Emergencies’, 32 Annual Review of Sociology (2006) 329. For some 
examples of socio-legal studies on ICL professional norms published in an international law journal, 
see R. Byrne, ‘Drawing the Missing Map: What Socio-legal Research Can Offer to International 
Criminal Trial Practice’, 26 Leiden Journal of International Law (2013) 991; and J. Jackson and Y. 
M’Boge, ‘The Effect of Legal Culture on the Development of International Evidentiary Practice: From 
the “Robing Room” to the “Melting Pot”’, 16 Leiden Journal of International Law (2013) 947-970.  
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on ICL methodologies is to interrogate the way ICL scholarship frames the process of 
interrogation itself whether in the courtroom or through scholarly debates.  
Perhaps the most sustained consideration of methodology in international law 
appeared as a special issue of the American Journal of International Law (AJIL) in 
1999. Two aspects of the symposium are noteworthy. First, is the editorial approach 
to the link between methodology and a scholarly discipline. In their final observations 
as editors for the symposium, Anne-Marie Slaughter and Steven Ratner suggest that 
‘the practice of a particular method is a matter of choice ... and that is a choice that 
should be as self-conscious as possible.’20 Of course, the process of scholarly inquiry 
can and must entail degrees of self-reflexivity, but ‘choices’ about methods will 
invariably be shaped by professional identities and prevailing paradigms, as alluded 
to above. As Koskenniemi remarked in his letter to the editors of the symposium,  
The difficulty lies in the assumption that there is some overarching standpoint, some 
nonmethodological method, a nonpolitical academic standard that allows that method 
or politics to be discussed from the outside of particular methodological or political 
controversies. Just as political liberalism assumes itself to be a nonpolitical, neutral 
framework within which the various parties can compete for influence in society, so 
your question – your initial question – assumed the existence or accessibility of some 
perspective or language that would not itself be vulnerable to the objections engendered 
by the academic styles … But there is no such neutral ground: like the shopping mall, 
the symposium is a mechanism of inclusion and exclusion, of blindness and insight.21 
Of particular note for this article was the initial exclusion of TWAIL approaches as 
‘distinctive ways of thinking about what international law is and should be.’22 Two 
TWAIL authors were invited to contribute to the symposium after its publication. The 
resulting article first appeared in the Chinese Journal of International Law.23 A year 
later, it was published in an edited book version of the AJIL symposium.24 Such an 
                                                 
20 A-M. Slaughter and S. R. Ratner, ‘The Method is the Message’, 93 American Journal of International 
Law (1999) 410 at 423. 
21 Koskenniemi, supra note 10, at 352. 
22 A. Anghie and B. S. Chimni, ‘Third World Approaches to International Law and Individual 
Responsibility in Internal Conflicts’, 2 Chinese Journal Of International Law (2003) 77-103, at 77. 
23 Ibid. 
24 S. R. Ratner and A-M. Slaughter (eds), The Methods of International Law (American Society of 
International Law, 2004), at 185-210. 
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episode underscores one of the central points of this article – that all scholars of 
international (criminal) law need to reflect on the politics of methodology.  
 
3. Mapping (often hidden) ICL methodologies 
The scholarly field of ICL comprises an impressively expansive academic enterprise 
of university courses and publications that relies on and supports ICL practice, 
especially as embodied within ICTs. As suggested above, fields and their actors co-
constitute a sense of purpose as well as dominant research paradigms and resulting 
methodologies. Although ICL scholarship tends to be open about its purpose, it is far 
less engaged with thinking about questions of theory and methodology. When 
acknowledged, international criminal lawyers tend to characterise methodology in 
classic doctrinal terms through analyses that develop criminal procedure or methods 
comprising discourse analyses of ICT jurisprudence.25 More detailed discussions 
about how scholars perform ICL are rare and systematic studies rarer still.26  
There are many reasons for these oversights. International lawyers are far less 
concerned with questions of methodology than a number of other social scientis ts.  
Influences from history and the social sciences have pushed some legal scholars to 
adopt explicit discussions about their methodologies, but this remains the exception 
rather than the norm, whether for ICL or international law more broadly. 27 
Notwithstanding robust voices of dissent and criticism,28 ICL scholarship is sustained 
by a particularly robust faith in the field’s success29 which tends to override 
recognition of the need for systematic and explicit debates on methodology. If 
‘setbacks’ are acknowledged,30 a range of responses centring on a lack of enforcement 
                                                 
25 For example, see I. Bantekas, ‘Reflections on Some Sources and Methods of International Criminal 
and Humanitarian Law’, 6 International Criminal Law Review (2006)121. 
26 Cf. E. Bikundo, International Criminal Law: Using or Abusing Legality?  (Ashgate, 2014). 
27 Some exceptions include: a symposium on method in international law: 93 American Journal of 
International Law (1999) 291-423; A. Orford, ‘In Praise of Description’, 25 Leiden Journal of 
International Law (2012) 609-625; A. Orford, ‘On international legal method’, 1 London Review of 
International Law (2013) 166-197; and G. Shaffer and T. Ginbsburg, ‘The Empirical Turn in  
International Legal Scholarship’, 106 American Journal of International Law (2012) 1-46.  
28 For example, see M. J. Osiel, ‘The Demise of International Criminal Law’, Humanity Journal Blog, 
10 June 2014, http://humanityjournal.org/blog/the-demise-of-international-criminal-law. 
29 S. M. H. Nouwen, ‘Justifying Justice’, in J. Crawford and M. Koskenniemi (eds), The Cambridge 
Companion to International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 327-351, at 328. 
30 Schabas, supra note 2, at 545-546. 
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and suggestions for improvement31 ensure that the progress narrative prevails.32 
Finally, the dominant paradigm informing ICL scholarship is a positivist, liberal one 
which favours doctrinal writing or at most, discourse analysis about the normative 
underpinnings of the ICL project. Empirical research, for example as found in the 
social sciences, is marginal for most legal research because normative analysis tends 
to displace explanation, prediction or analyses of human behaviour.33 ‘The normative 
character of the law also means that the validity of doctrinal research must inevitab ly 
rest upon developing consensus within the scholastic community, rather than on an 
appeal to any external reality.’34  
In the following section, I first explore the purpose of ICL scholarship and the 
implications this has on under-theorisation as well as methodological naïveté. I then 
map the various extant methodologies to tease out how particular methodologies – 
whether spoken or unspoken – will tend to reinforce or disrupt ICL’s raison d’être. 
Despite its narrowly technical nature and specific doctrinal focus, the project 
of ICL is ambitious in scope: the realisation of global justice itself where justice is 
understood in opposition to politics.35 In the words of David Luban,  
Speaking law to power…is the major point of ICJ [international criminal justice]. Its 
mode of functioning is expressive, and its aim is norm projection, the dissemination 
through trials, punishments and jurisprudence of a set of norms very different from 
the Machiavellian brutality of the past. The radical goal of ICJ is a moral 
transformation of how ordinary men and women regard political violence against 
civilians.36  
                                                 
31 Such sentiments are encapsulated by Robert Cryer’s motivations for doing ICL research: ‘My critique 
of the international criminal law regime is born not of a desire to undermine the regime, but to ask what 
it could have been, and might still be.’ R. Cryer, Prosecuting International Crimes (Cambridge 
University Press, 2005), at 6.  
32 T. Skouteris, The Notion of Progress in International Law Discourse (T. M. C. Asser Press, 2010);  
for example, see P. Akhavan, ‘The Rise, and Fall, and Rise, of International Criminal Justice’, 11 
Journal of International Criminal Justice (2013) 527; and M. Damaška, ‘The International Criminal 
Court Between Aspiration and Achievement’, 14 UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign 
Affairs (2009) 19-35. 
33 P. Chynoweth, ‘Legal Research’, in A. Knight and L. Ruddock (eds), Advanced Research Methods 
in the Built Environment (Wiley-Blackwell, 2008) 28-38, at 30. 
34 Ibid. 
35 S. Nouwen and W. Werner, ‘Doing Justice to the Political: The International Criminal Court in 
Uganda and Sudan’, 21 European Journal of International Law (2010) 941. 
36 Emphasis in original, Luban, supra note 4, at 509.  
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Although all areas of international legal scholarship can be understood as striving for 
‘global justice’ in some way, ICL’s focus on the most heinous of acts (determined as 
war crimes, genocide, crimes against humanity and aggression) means that it is hard 
to discount, especially if we are presented with the ‘choice’ between ‘global justice’ 
or its denial. Although ‘global justice’ itself is rarely theorised37, the proliferation and 
amplification of ICL accounts tends to crowd out other voices and lived experiences 
of ‘justice’.38  
This focus on ‘global justice’ ultimately rests not on evidence-based appraisals 
about the effectiveness of ICJ,39 but instead on a deeply held faith by ICL practitioners 
and scholars in the transformative potential of law.40 Thus, often there is no distinct ion 
between scholarship on ICL and ICL scholarship in support of the field itself.41 Such 
an understanding of the ICL scholar as a tireless, committed advocate for ‘global 
justice’ is fuelled by a sense of urgency where stories of new atrocities are readily 
accessible: ICL can be used simultaneously to punish individuals while dissuading 
potential perpetrators from committing future crimes.42 This sense of urgency is only 
heightened if ICL mechanisms are understood as removed from and yet dependent on 
politics for their success:43 here the ICL advocate must persuade the powerful of the 
legitimacy of their global justice quest as an apolitical project for saving humanity no 
less.44 Thus, the promise of ICL is radically overambitious in the way it seeks to realise 
(a particularised) ‘global justice’ for humanity, while adopting a radically narrow 
practice – typically international trials of individuals – to achieve such a goal. 
Although ICL practice can be seen as highly selective, such criticisms can be 
countered through failings in implementation rather than the goal of ICL per se. 
                                                 
37 F. Mégret, ‘What Sort of Global Justice is “International Criminal Justice”?’, 13 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice (2015) 77. 
38 S. M. H. Nouwen, ‘“As you set out for Ithaka”, practical, epistemological, ethical, and existential’, 
27(1) Leiden Journal of International Law (2014) 227 at 255; and K. Clarke, Fictions of Justice: The 
International Criminal Court and the Challenge of Legal Pluralism in Sub -Saharan Africa (Cambridge 
University Press, 2009).  
39 Ibid 229. 
40 D. S. Koller, ‘The Faith of the International Criminal Lawyer’, 40 New York University Journal of 
International Law and Politics (2008) 1019; and Drumbl, supra note 4, at 546. 
41 Nouwen, As you set out for Ithaka, supra note 38, at 229; and Byrne, supra note 19, at 1000. 
42 For example, J. F. Alexander, ‘The International Criminal Court and the Prevention of Atrocities: 
Predicting the Court’s Impact’, 54 Villanova Law Review (2009) 1. 
43 See K. A. Rodman, ‘Justice as a Dialogue Between Law and Politics’, 12 Journal of International 
Criminal Justice (2014) 437. 
44 For example, see Luban, supra note 4, at 509. On the relationship between the international lawyer 
and power, see A. Orford, ‘Embodying Internationalism: The Making of International Lawyers’, 
19 Australian Year Book of International Law (1998) 1-34. 
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Making concessions about external failings of ICJ also helps to shift attention away 
from critique of internal flaws within ICL norms and scholarship. 
First, it is useful to reflect on the way that theory is understood within mainstream ICL 
writings. Much of the time, theory is simply not recognised as a valid aspect of ICL 
research.45According to Frédéric Mégret,  
the theory of international criminal justice is often understood as the theory of its 
institutions (primarily the tribunals) and its legal practices, rather than something that 
needs to be specifically understood in terms of justice. In fact, it might be argued that 
international criminal justice has less of a theory of its global justice than a theory of 
its fairness to, notably, defendants.46 
When theory does appear, it is often in instrumentalist registers, whereby typically 
domestic liberal theories are used for international analogies. Writers engaging in 
critical appraisals of domestic liberal analogies tend to engage in discourse analys is 
about how ICL scholarship and jurisprudence has failed to tease out tensions within 
(domestic) liberal theory.47 In particular, they point out the ways in which (ordinary) 
domestic crimes are framed as social deviance whereas (extraordinary) internationa l 
crimes often occur in the context of social collapse. Whether acknowledged or not, 
liberalism remains the dominant paradigm within the ICL field and its influence is 
crucial in shaping (typically) narrow doctrinal analyses that are framed by positivis t 
epistemologies and ontologies fixated on individual responsibility for various types of 
extreme, direct violence.  
Aside from doctrinal accounts and a range of discourse analysis studies 
grounded in ICT jurisprudence, most ICL research using other methods tends to be 
inspired by non-legal disciplines or at the very least, is shaped by extra-discip line 
agendas and theories. Most ICL work contains no explicit statement on methodology48 
and when they do, it is far from systematic. This is surprising for a number of 
                                                 
45 Cf. a symposium on ICL and philosophy: A. Matwijkiw, ‘Introduction: On the Philosophy of 
International Criminal Law’, 14 International Criminal Law Review (2014) 669. 
46 Mégret (2015), supra note 37, at 78. 
47 D. Robinson, ‘The Identity Crisis of International Criminal Law’, 21 Leiden Journal of International 
Law (2008) 925; D. Robinson, ‘A Cosmopolitan Liberal Account of International Criminal Law’, 26 
Leiden Journal of International Law (2013) 127; and I. Tallgren, ‘The Sense and Sensibility of 
International Criminal Law’, 13 European Journal of International Law (2002) 561, at 565-568. 
48 An exception is A. Smeulers et al., ‘The Selection of Situations by the ICC: An Empirically Based 
Evaluation of the OTP’s Performance’, 15 International Criminal Law Review (2015) 1. 
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commentators who have argued that ICL’s central purpose of ending impunity and 
mass atrocity should and can be tested through examining practices both during trials 
as well as their fallout. For example, Rosemary Byrne argues that the rapid rise of the 
international criminal justice field makes it an ideal site for intersecting legal and 
social science approaches. In particular, she highlights a lack of empirical research on 
ICL trials despite being key sites for ICJ’s legitimacy and legitimation.49  
Such calls for testing the extent to which ICL is an effective policy tool for  
prevention and punishment tend to focus on empirical analysis,50 often grounded in 
criminological theory.51 Although most ICL scholars and criminologists do not engage 
with each other,52 when they do, the methodological emphasis is on the strengths and 
weaknesses of using empirical data to fill in gaps of ICL analysis.53 Such an emphasis 
though on questions of proof that can validate the ICL field ex post facto fails to 
interrogate underlying ICL frameworks and assumptions, namely prevailing 
worldviews within the field. Empirical data here serves as a way of strengthening 
established liberal ICL approaches that focus on direct violence; questions about 
structural violence do not need to be raised.  
Feminist approaches within ICL are most comfortable in stating theoretica l, 
methodological and normative agendas.54 As in the case of TWAIL scholars, feminist 
scholars regard their approach not simply as an intellectual endeavour, but as a 
political project for social change, where the production of ideas are placed in their 
political contexts. Feminist ICL scholars have therefore contributed to the 
development of ICL methodologies particularly through mapping the gendered nature 
                                                 
49 Byrne, supra note 19, at 991-993. For a recent exception which uses quantitative and qualitative 
methods in assessing understandings of crimes against humanity, see L. Sadat, ‘Crimes against 
Humanity in the Modern Age’, 107 American Journal of International Law (2013) 334.  
50 For Van der Wilt, empirical methods are beyond the training of international criminal lawyers and 
thus are beyond the purview of the field: H. Van der Wilt, ‘Universal Ju risdiction under Attack: An 
Assessment of African Misgivings towards International Criminal Justices as Administered by Western 
States’, 9 Journal of International Criminal Justice (2011) 1043. 
51 For example, see U. Ewald, ‘“Predictably Irrational” – International Sentencing and its Discourse 
against the Backdrop of Preliminary Empirical Findings on ICTY Sentencing Practices’ , 10 
International Criminal Law Review (2010) 365. 
52 Especially see P. Roberts and N. McMillan, ‘For Criminology in International Criminal Justice’, 1 
Journal of International Criminal Justice (2003) 315; and D. L. Rothe and C. W. Mullins, ‘Toward a 
Criminology of International Criminal Law: An Integrated Theory of Internationa l Criminal 
Violations’, 33 International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice  (2009) 97. 
53 Drumbl, supra note 4. Rowen and Hagan, supra note 19.  
54 For example, D. Buss, ‘Performing Legal Order: Some Feminist Thoughts on International Criminal 
Law’, 11 International Criminal Law Review (2011) 409. 
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of ICL doctrines and discourse. According to Doris Buss, for feminists working in 
ICL, the ‘task was and is to ensure the ongoing visibility of the gendered nature of the 
harms women face in conflict, while maintaining recognition of the political, social 
and economic complexity of violence and conflict.’55 Although feminist approaches 
on excavating silences and deconstructing discursive binaries are applicable to any 
aspect of ICL,56 overt feminist engagement with ICL concentrates on sexual 
violence.57 Significant ‘successes’ have resulted from these efforts,58 but more self-
reflexive feminist work within ICL has also pointed to the ‘unintended consequences’ 
of these efforts which have included a denial of women’s agency and the conflat ion 
of all harms as ones of ‘sex, not of violence or gender oppression.’59 Thus, Karen 
Engle asks us to ‘reconsider whether increasing the number of convictions for sex 
crimes should be a central goal of international feminist advocacy.’60 Such feminis t-
inspired reflection could resonate with any aspect of ICL scholarship to facilita te 
research on the purpose of the international criminal trial, yet to date, feminism’s 
influences within the ICL field have rarely extended beyond a focus on sexual 
violence.  
Perhaps enjoying a more widespread presence than feminist scholars, but 
equally under-represented within mainstream ICL scholarship are those contributions 
of scholars committed to broad-based qualitative, interdisciplinary research. As this 
type of research is self-reflexive and often entails data collection beyond the formal 
spheres of ICL,61 it enables scholars to confront dissonances within the dominant ICL 
progress narrative of ending impunity. Such research is informed by 
anthropologically-oriented approaches that seek to understand the lived experiences 
of ICL. Particularly noteworthy here for their links with TWAIL sensibilities are the 
                                                 
55 Ibid 413. 
56 See H. Charlesworth, ‘Feminist Methods in International Law’ (1999) 93 AJIL 379.  
57 For example, see F. N. Aolain, ‘Gendered Harms and their Interface with International Criminal 
Law’, 16 International Feminist Journal of Politics (2014) 622; J. Halley, ‘Rape in Berlin : 
Reconsidering the Criminalisation of Rape in the International Law of Armed  Conflict’, 9 Melbourne 
Journal of International Law (2008) 78; and C. MacKinnon, ‘The ICTR’s Legacy on Sexual Violence’ , 
14 New England Journal of International and Comparative Law (2007-2008) 211. 
58 For an assessment of the Preventing Sexual Violence Initiative of 2012, see P. Kirby, ‘Ending sexual 
violence in conflict: the Preventing Sexual Violence Initiative and its critics’, 91 International Affairs  
(2015) 457-472. 
59 K. Engle, ‘Feminism and its (Dis)contents: Criminalizing Wartime Rape’, 99 American Journal of 
International Law (2005) 778, at 815. Also see Buss, supra note 54, at 415. 
60 Engle, supra note 59 at 816. 
61 Nouwen, As you set out for Ithaka, supra note 38. 
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contributions of Kamari Clarke, Sara Kendall, Sarah Nouwen, Immi Tallgren and 
Richard Wilson62 through their efforts at problematizing the ICL project, especially as 
it plays out in the Global South. Of course, an array of research touching on ICL 
concerns is undertaken in a number of disciplines, yet my concern here is with the 
extent to which legally trained researchers engage with such methods and seek to share 
them with ICL audiences whether in the Journal of International Criminal Justice or 
the methodologically more diverse International Criminal Law Review.  
 
4. Towards a TWAIL Transdisciplinarity for ICL? Appraising 
Methodological Harmonies and Dissonances between ICL and TWAIL  
TWAIL is a scholarly movement animated by a strong normative purpose: ending the 
subjugation of Third World peoples through an emancipatory approach to 
International Law. As in the case of feminist legal scholars, the TWAIL scholar sees 
herself as part of an intellectual movement that is simultaneously political and so she 
tends to be open about her theoretical and methodological underpinnings.63 This is 
partly as a way of constructing an agenda for action: researchers can lay out scholarly 
strategies through which to advance their stated cause of Third World resistance to 
ongoing forms of subjugation and poverty. Despite often sustained discussion on the 
centrality of methodology for TWAIL, this does not equate with a shared approach to 
the study of international law.64 As in the case of ICL, at best we can identify general 
trends and sensibilities within the TWAIL movement.  
                                                 
62 See for example, all of the articles in the 2015 ‘Global Justice Symposium of this Journal; Clarke, 
supra note 38; S. Kendall, ‘Donors Justice: Recasting International Criminal Accountability’, 24 Leiden 
Journal of International Law (2011) 585; S. Kendall and S. Nouwen, ‘Representational Practices at the 
International Criminal Court: The Gap between Juridified and Abstract Victimhood’, 76 Law and 
Contemporary Problems (2013) 235; Nouwen, supra note 29; I. Tallgren, ‘We Did It? The Vertigo of 
Law and Everyday Life at the Diplomatic Conference on the Establishment of the International 
Criminal Court’, 12 Leiden Journal of International Law (1998) 683; Tallgren, Sensibility of 
International Criminal Law, supra note 46; R. A. Wilson, Writing History in International Criminal 
Trials (Cambridge University Press, 2011); R. A. Wilson, ‘Through the Lens of International Criminal 
Law: Comprehending the African Context of Crimes at the International Criminal Court’, 11 Studies in 
Ethnicity and Nationalism (2011) 106; R. A. Wilson, ‘Gangster’s Paradise? Framing Crime in Sub -
Saharan Africa’, 4 Humanity (2013) 449. 
63 Anghie and Chimni, supra note 22; and B. S. Chimni, ‘Third World Approaches to International 
Law: A Manifesto’, 8 International Community Law Review (2006) 3, at 22. 
64 O. C. Okafor, ‘Critical Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL): Theory, 
Methodology, or Both?’, 10 International Community Law Review (2008) 371, at 375. Also see the 
foreword and article by John Reynolds and Sujith Xavier in this symposium. 
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Why then engage with TWAIL at all if it does not offer a systematic methodology for 
ICL? Here I suggest that acquainting ourselves with TWAIL’s methodologica l 
approaches is the first step required for the ICL field to cultivate more intellectua lly 
open and rigorous discussions about the nature of ICL research in general. In addition, 
learning from TWAIL experiences highlights how ICL can benefit from a number of 
approaches and sensibilities within international law more generally.  
As ‘TWAIL is both a political and an intellectual movement…[it] therefore … 
has multiple histories’65 constructed particularly by contemporary TWAIL scholars 
making sense of the movement’s origins. During the Cold War, a select group of 
international lawyers hailing from the Third World understood their role as facilitat ing 
the concomitant demise of imperialism and the self-determination of Third World 
peoples through international law. These anti-imperial efforts of Third World scholars 
and practitioners during the 1960s and 1970s have come to be referred to as ‘TWAIL 
I’ scholarship. For our purposes here in mapping TWAIL methodologies, it is more 
useful to focus on the methodological contributions of ‘TWAIL II’ scholars whose 
work began around the same time as the meteoric rise of ICL in the 1990s.66 While 
ICL is a specialised regime of international law, its normative links with more robust 
forms of international executive rule in the Global South means that is has come to 
play a central role in hegemonic governance projects.67 This is in spite of the fact that 
ICL scholars often see themselves as working against power in the name of 
humanity.68 Although often hailing from elite Western institutions themselves, recent 
TWAIL writers tend to revel in striking counter-hegemonic poses against prevailing 
neo-liberal forms of governance in the Third Word.69 Unlike ICL with its ever-
expansive moves within the fields of international law and governance, TWAIL 
scholarship emphasises marginality and ‘alternative histories’70 so as to disrupt 
                                                 
65 A. F. Sunter, ‘TWAIL as Naturalised Epistemological Inquiry’, 20 Canadian Journal of Law and 
Jurisprudence (2007) 475, at 481. Also see M Mutua, ‘What is TWAIL?’, 94 American Society of 
International Law Proceedings (2000) 31, at 32.  
66 For an overview of the similarities and differences between TWAIL I and TWAIL II, see M. L. 
Burgis, Boundaries of Discourse in the International Court of Justice: Mapping Arguments in Arab 
Territorial Disputes (Brill, 2009), at 31-33.  
67 A. Orford, International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect  (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), at ch. 4.  
68 Simpson, supra note 11, at 171.  
69 On counter-hegemony, see B. Rajagopal. ‘Counter-hegemonic International Law: Rethinking Human 
Rights and Development as Third World Strategy’ 27 Third World Quarterly (2006) 767.  
70 P. Parmar, ‘TWAIL: An Epistemological Inquiry’, 10 International Community Law Review (2008) 
363, at 367. 
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dominant approaches, whether in relation to ICL or any other area of public 
international law. The most obvious example of such a stance is the way in which 
TWAIL scholars stress the importance of continuing to use ‘Third World’ 
terminology, not for its analytical rigour, but for its political connotations of 
opposition and necessary resistance.71  
Although TWAIL scholars will differ regarding their research emphases, theories and 
methodologies, we can at least identify TWAIL’s central goals. In fact, there are a 
number of explicit statements listing these aims, particularly by TWAIL II scholars 
who have sought to consolidate a TWAIL research agenda. For Makau Mutua,  
TWAIL is driven by three basic, interrelated and purposeful objectives. The first is to 
understand, deconstruct, and unpack the uses of international law as a medium for the 
creation and perpetuation of a racialized hierarchy of international norms and 
institutions that subordinate non-Europeans to Europeans. Second, it seeks to 
construct and present an alternative normative legal edifice for international 
governance. Finally, TWAIL seeks through scholarship, policy, and politics to 
eradicate the conditions of underdevelopment in the Third World.72 
This statement encapsulates the central tension animating TWAIL scholarship –
suspicion and faith in the possibility of transformation through international law. 73 
Particularly through detailed historical reconsiderations of the international law 
discipline, TWAIL scholarship has sought to place ‘the dynamic of difference’ at the 
centre of international law research relating to the (colonial) past as well as its (neo-
colonial) present.74 Such accounts imbue a deep distrust in the promise of internationa l 
law. Yet rather than adopting typical post-structuralist rejections of law, TWAIL 
scholars also tend to hold on to the possibility of ending the subjugation of Third 
World people(s).75 Thus, although many TWAIL scholars invoke a discourse of 
                                                 
71 See K. Mickelson’Rhetoric and Rage: Third World Voices in International Legal Discourse’ 18 
Wisconsin International Law Journal (1998) 353, at 360-362. 
72 Mutua, What is TWAIL, supra note 65, at 31.  
73 D. P. Fidler, ‘Revolt Against or From Within the West? TWAIL, the Developing World, and the 
Future Direction of International Law’ 2 Chinese Journal of International Law (2003) 29; and M. 
Khosla, ‘The TWAIL Discourse: The Emergence of a New Phase’ 9 International Community Law 
Review (2007) 291, at 296. 
74 A. Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law  (Cambridge University 
Press, 2005).  
75 Especially see J. Haskell, ‘TRAIL-ing TWAIL: Arguments and Blind Spots in Third World 
Approaches to International Law’, 27 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence (2014) 383. 
16 
 
‘resistance’ that conjures up revolutionary imagery, it is in fact reform through law 
that is the dominant project of both TWAIL I and TWAIL II.76  
As was the case for ICL above, TWAIL’s purpose co-constitutes the particula r 
theories and methodologies used by its adherents. Across my own schematic survey 
of TWAIL texts, I discern four broad and interrelated methodologies which have much 
in common with critical strands within ICL scholarship surveyed above.77 Indeed a 
question to raise here is about the extent to which a TWAIL approach to ICL would 
be distinct from other critical approaches to ICL, especially those under the ‘Critica l 
Approaches to International Criminal Law’ umbrella.78 What constitutes ‘TWAILing 
ICL’? First, let us note what a TWAIL methodology would entail: 1) inter -
disciplinarity or transdisciplinarity with the related call to learn from other critica l 
approaches within and beyond legal scholarship, including feminism, Critical Race 
Theory and international law ‘Newstream’ scholarship;79 2) a global historicisation of 
international law that places questions of subalternity at the centre of the discipline; 80 
3) quasi-sociological81 as well as anthropological approaches that seek to understand 
structures of global governance as well as every day experiences of international law 
for peoples of the Global South;82 4) discourse analyses informed with a historica l 
sensibility for the marginalised and a suspicion about universalis ing narratives, such 
as ICL’s purported aim of realising ‘global justice’ for ‘humanity’. If we compare 
these four strands to critical work being undertaken on ICL whether by legal or non-
legal scholars, it is clear that there are more similarities than differences between the 
two approaches; indeed, often scholars identify as sitting across or within both camps. 
                                                 
76 See L. Eslava and S. Pahuja, ‘Between Resistance and Reform: TWAIL and the Universality of 
International Law’, 3 Trade, Law and Development (2011) 103.  
77 Sunter notes three: indisciplinarity, historical methods and the use of ‘localized cultural evidence to 
challenge the universality of the theoretical underpinnings of international law.’ Sunte r, supra note 65, 
at 488. 
78 In particular, see C. Schwöbel (ed.), Critical Approaches to International Criminal Law: An 
Introduction (Routledge, 2014); the 2015 ‘Global Justice’ symposium in this Journal; and as a reaction 
to this trend, see D. Jacobs, ‘Sitting on the Wall Looking in: Some Reflections on the Critique of 
International Criminal Law’, 28 Leiden Journal of International Law (2015) 1-11.  
79 See Mickelson on transdisciplinarity, supra note 71; on intellectual coalitions: Mutua, What is 
TWAIL, supra note 65, at 38. On the Newstream, see D. Cass, ‘Navigating the Newstream: Recent 
Critical Scholarship in International Law’, 65 Nordic Journal of International Law (1996) 341. 
80 On subalternity, see D. Otto, ‘Subalternity and International Law: The Problems of Global 
Community and the Incommensurability of Difference’, 5 Social and Legal Studies (1996) 337; and 
Mutua, What is TWAIL, supra note 65, at 37; and history, especially see Anghie, supra note 73.  
81 Haskell, supra note 75, at 396.  
82 Eslava and Pahuja, supra note 76; L. Eslava, ‘Istanbul vignettes: observing the everyday operation 
of international law’, 2 London Review of International Law (2014) 3. 
17 
 
Perhaps what TWAIL offers most for ICL is its keen political commitment to 
interrogating and potentially liberating the Global South from various forms of 
legalised oppression. Such a focus is invaluable in light of contemporary debates over 
ICJ’s undue focus on the Global South, particularly, Africa. 
How well TWAIL scholars have deployed these methodologies and whether 
they have been successful in doing more than critique is beyond the scope of this 
article.83 Equipped with this overview of TWAIL sensibilities, we can at least apply 
and compare them with dominant ICL approaches below in this article’s final section.  
 
5. Juridifying Violence/Doing Violence to the Political84 
In sections three and four, we saw how despite very different agendas during and after 
the Cold War, both ICL and TWAIL scholars have rallied around the possibility of 
global transformation through law whether understood as ending impunity or effecting 
radical structural change. Both ICL and TWAIL are also broadly committed to limit ing 
if not ending certain forms of violence altogether even if disagreements prevail over 
the types of violence to single out and resist juridically. With its emphasis on 
colonialism and its legacies, TWAIL is concerned with the everyday violence that 
results through neoliberal and neo-colonial forms of governance in the Global South 
whether realised as classic individual criminal harms or collective conditions such as 
poverty and racial inequality. Conversely, ICL’s central concern is on forms of direct, 
extreme violence or crises that tend to occur during conflict and social collapse. 85 
These ICL and TWAIL concerns are not necessarily mutually distinct as TWAIL 
scholars would seek to account for historical and continuing forms of inequality that 
often cause such conflicts to break out. It is these ‘background’ conditions of social 
collapse and conflict that impels TWAIL scholars to ‘foreground’ histories of 
oppression and marginality. ICJ interventions are overwhelmingly concentrated on 
examples of direct, extreme violence across the Global South, particularly in Africa. 86 
                                                 
83 See E. Bikundo, ‘Saving Humanity from Hell: International Criminal Law and Permanent Crisis’, 44 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law (2013) 89, at 96.  
84 This subheading invokes the title of Nouwen and Werner’s article, ‘Doing Justice to the Political’, 
supra note 35.  
85 This is the case for international law generally: H. Charlesworth, ‘International Law: A Discipline in 
Crisis’, 65 Modern Law Review (2002) 377. 
86 See Asad Kiyani’s contribution in this symposium. 
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Given TWAIL’s geo-strategic concerns, it is then disappointing that when mainstream 
ICL scholars consider African exceptionalism, they rarely acknowledge TWAIL 
methodologies which are well-placed to link colonial legacies with perceptions of 
selectivity and oversight of various structural concerns.87  
One of the reasons for this is divergent understandings about the nature of 
violence itself. A key requirement of ICL trials and thus the bulk of ICL scholarship 
is to juridify88 and thus criminalize and usually individualise extremely messy and 
complex events.89 This is particularly pronounced in the context of criminal trials with 
their rigorous evidence requirements. Although ICL jurisprudence and scholarship 
considers the context of violence, such accounts tend to focus on (Third World) 
‘indigenous cause[s] of violence (the illegitimate seizure of power by local overlords, 
the abusive projection of that power by “nationalists” or “tyrants”, the torture and 
oppression of local populations, the delusions of these local populations and so on)’. 90 
Narratives recognising other contextual factors, like colonialism, are suppressed. By 
framing the causes of Third World violence as indigenous, the justice/violence binary 
can then serve as a powerful rhetorical device in affirming the need for ICL 
deliverance in the Global South: 
[t]oo often judges use history and a sense of an uncontrollable past, pacified only 
through the justice meted out by the Courts, as a rhetorical strategy. But that is a 
strategy which disempowers communities affected by violence and which can 
stigmatise rather than cleanse. Such a view of the past as illustrative of violence, 
lawlessness and “ungovernable passions”, can perpetuate the sense of violence in 
certain peoples’ histories as cyclical or natural.91 
                                                 
87 For example for an article on ICL’s African exceptionalism that devotes only a few sentences to 
TWAIL, see H. Van der Wilt, ‘Universal Jurisdiction under Attack: An Assessment of African  
Misgivings towards International Criminal Justices as Administered by Western States’, 9 Journal of 
International Criminal Justice (2011) 1043, at 1066. For a broader consideration of the ICC in Africa, 
see K. M. Clarke and S.-J. Koulen, ‘The Legal Politics of the Article 16 Decision: The International 
Criminal Court, the UN Security Council and Ontologies of a Contemporary Compromise’, 7 African 
Journal of Legal Studies (2014) 297.  
88 According to Buss, ‘the shift to criminalisation is an unprecedented move towards a highly legalistic 
response to large-scale violence in which social context and inequality are difficult to visualise and 
repair.’ Buss, supra note 54, at 419. 
89 Tallgren, Sensibility of International Criminal Law, supra note 47, at 593-594.  
90 Simpson, supra note 11, at 171.  
91 D. Joyce, ‘The Historical Function of International Criminal Trials: Re-thinking International 
Criminal Law’, 73 Nordic Journal of International Law (2004) 461, at 464.  
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Out of this morass of political context,92 a turn to individual criminal responsibility in 
ICL trials and scholarship requires individual, linear narratives93 that simplify and 
criminalise conflict.94 In such accounts, the inevitable emphasis will be on 
understanding the link between (usually Third World) individuals and acts of extreme 
and direct violence,95 rather than more elusive forms of structural or ‘slow’ violence 
that often contribute to the particular offences under scrutiny.96  
Where ICL scholars tend to see the trial as effecting rupture and repair, 
TWAIL scholars seek to highlight colonial continuities that have produced these 
episodes of violence.97 For example, scholarship about ICC trials arising from the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) would stress the need for a deep appreciation 
of the DRC’s colonial history not simply as an artefact of the past, but as an ongoing 
aspect of the present and the future. In this way, a central element of TWAILing ICL 
requires not simply an awareness of (static) structure, but violence as an enfolding and 
unfolding process. This is best captured in Rob Nixon’s notion of ‘slow violence ’ 
which he developed in response to Johan Galtung’s notion of ‘structural violence’. 98 
For Rob Nixon,  
In contrast to the static connotations of structural violence … slow violence 
foreground[s] questions of time, movement, and change, however gradual. The 
explicitly temporal emphasis of slow violence allows us to keep front and centre the 
representational challenges and imaginative dilemmas posted not just by 
imperceptible violence but by imperceptible change whereby violence is decoupled 
from its original causes by the workings of time. 
… Simply put, structural violence is a theory that entails rethinking different notions 
of causation and agency with respect to violent effects. Slow violence, by contrast, 
might well include forms of structural violence, but has a wider descriptive range in 
                                                 
92 M. Koskenniemi, ‘Between Impunity and Show Trials’, 6 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations 
Law (2002) 1. 
93 Simpson, supra note 11. 
94 S. Dezalay, supra note 18. 
95 See M. Mutua,‘Savages, Victims and Saviours: The Metaphor of Human Rights’, 42 Harvard 
International Law Journal (2001) 201. 
96 Drumbl, supra note 4, at 600.  
97 On this notion of justice as rupture, see J Balint et al., ‘Rethinking Transitional Justice, Redressing 
Indigenous Harm: A New Conceptual Approach’, 8 International Journal of Transitional Justice 
(2014) 194-216, at 200-201.  
98 For more recent considerations of structural violence, see P. Farmer, ‘On Suffering and Structural 
Violence: A View from Below’, 125 Daedelus (1996) 261; and P. Farmer, ‘An Anthropology of 
Structural Violence’, 45 Current Anthropology (2004) 305.  
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calling attention, not simply to questions of agency, but to broader, more complex 
descriptive categories of violence enacted slowly over time.99 
In applying this understanding to ICL, Sarah Nouwen suggests that  
[it] is not to say that international criminal law should see slow violence; there are 
more ways to see the world than through the lens of international criminal law … The 
problem, however, lies in the monopolizing tendencies of a fashionable topic: the 
foregrounding of international criminal justice backgrounds something else … [and 
thus] blinds the world to slow violence and other injustices.100 
As discussed above, the (pre)dominance of ICL frameworks reliant on the 
violence/justice binary radically restricts how we see harm and its repair. A TWAIL 
sensibility to ICL would encourage scepticism and self-reflexivity when think ing 
about law vis-à-vis violence, whether in its slow or urgent manifestations. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This article has used the case of ICL’s and TWAIL’s lack of dialogue to reveal the 
many theoretical and methodological possibilities available through (re)newed 
scholarly conversations. Yet we have also seen that this process of engaging explic it ly 
with such questions of methodology reveals the extent to which neither TWAIL nor 
ICL scholars can deliver on their stated and unstated goals. Ending atrocity and 
impunity or global racism and ‘underdevelopment’ are noble ends, but scholars of 
international law need to reflect more deeply on the institutional factors that have 
given rise to such scholarly agendas that often tend to remain immune from interna l 
critique. Thus, this article is also a call for circumspection and modesty as a scholarly 
methodology not simply vis-à-vis ICL and TWAIL, but for the field of internationa l 
law more broadly. 
 
                                                 
99 R. Nixon, Slow Violence and the Environmentalism of the Poor (Harvard University Press, 2011), at 
11.  
100 Nouwen, As you set out for Ithaka, supra note 38, at 255.  
